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CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Donald P. Boyle Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Virginia courts and the General Assembly have effected a
number of changes in civil practice and procedure during the
past year. This article focuses on some significant developments
of interest to the general litigation attorney.
II. RECENT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Pleading
In Hensley v. Dreyer,' buyers of a residential lot sued the
sellers for fraud after discovering that the lot did not contain a
septic system, as the sellers allegedly represented. The buyers
prayed for rescission of the deed and damages in their Bill of
Complaint. The trial court found that there had been no fraud,
but concluded that there had been a mutual mistake of fact,
and ordered rescission on the grounds that the sellers had not
been prejudiced by this variance between the pleadings and the
proofs.2
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and entered final
judgment for the sellers. The court held that a judgment or
decree may not be based on facts not alleged or on a right not
pleaded and claimed. Every litigant is entitled to be told in
plain and explicit language the adversary's ground of complaint.
In the case of a variance between evidence and allegations,
* Associate, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Va.; BA., 1984, University of Vir-
ginia; J.D., 1989, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary.
1. 247 Va. 25, 439 S.E.2d 372 (1994).
2. Id. at 28-29, 439 S.E.2d at 374-75.
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section 8.01-377 of the Virginia Code gives a trial court the
discretion to permit amendment of the pleadings or to deter-
mine the facts and render judgment, but only on the condition
that no prejudice results. The sellers had not had the opportu-
nity to offer evidence in support of one defense to a mutual
mistake claim and thus could have been prejudiced.3
The court applied the same rule in Smith v. Sink,4 a case
involving a dispute over access to a public road. The Smiths
sought both a declaration that the road in question was not a
public road and an injunction against the use of that road by
Sink. The court ruled that although the power of an equity
court is broad, it cannot extend beyond the rights asserted by
the parties.5 Therefore, the trial court erred in ruling that Sink
had a prescriptive easement in the road. Sink's failure to plead
or to claim and prove a prescriptive easement through the
production of evidence precluded the imposition of such an
easement.6
B. Causes of Action and Damages
1. Conspiracy
In Luckett v. Jennings,' the plaintiff, a real estate developer,
sued after various difficulties arose out of an agreement to
develop two parcels of land in Manassas. Plaintiff alleged the
following in his claim under the Virginia Conspiracy Statute:'
The acts of Mr. Jennings, his sons and Mr. McGinnis
alleged above were the result of a mutual undertaking of
Mr. Jennings, his sons and Mr. McGinnis to willfully and
maliciously compel Mr. Luckett to make additional capital
contributions against his will and to willfully and malicious-
3. Id. A "settled maxim of equity jurisprudence ... denies relief based on a mu-
tual mistake of fact when a written instrument is involved and the equities are
equal." Id. at 30, 439 S.E.2d at 375.
4. 247 Va. 423, 442 S.E.2d 646 (1994).
5. Id. at 425, 442 S.E.2d at 647.
6. Id., 442 S.E.2d at 648.
7. 246 Va. 303, 435 S.E.2d 400 (1993).
8. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-499 to -500 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
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ly injure Mr. Luckett in his business in violation of Code
§ 18.2-499. 9
The trial court sustained demurrers to this count on the ground
that it failed to allege an injury to plaintiffs business, as dis-
tinct from his personal interest as an investor and employee in
a corporation in which defendants were associated, as required
by the statute.'0
The supreme court reversed finding that the motion for judg-
ment sufficiently alleged an injury to plaintiff's business."
Whether plaintiff had sustained injury to a business that was
distinguishable from the corporation in which he was an in-
vestor was an issue of fact to be resolved at trial.'
2. Contracts
a. Duress
In Goode v. Burke Town Plaza, Inc.,"3 the landlord sued to
set aside on the grounds of duress its agreement to subordinate
its interest in real property to the tenant's loan. The landlord
alleged that the tenant had abusively threatened litigation and
that several "elderly beneficiaries" of the landlord, a partner-
ship, had acquiesced in the tenant's demands rather than "face
financial ruin."4 The supreme court declined to recognize this
claim for economic duress, explaining, "[d]uress exists when a
defendant commits a wrongful act sufficient to prevent a plain-
tiff from exercising his free will, thereby coercing the plaintiffs
consent .... [T]he application of economic pressure by threat-
ening to enforce a legal right is not a wrongful act and there-
fore cannot constitute duress.""5 Even if the acts of the tenant
and its counsel were "unethical, strident, and coercive," they
9. 246 Va. at 305, 435 S.E.2d at 401.
10. Id. at 306, 435 S.E.2d at 402.
11. Id. at 306-07, 435 S.E.2d at 402.
12. Id. at 308, 435 S.E.2d at 402. The court did not reach the substantive issue
in its review.
13. 246 Va. 407, 436 S.E.2d 450 (1993).
14. Id. at 410, 436 S.E.2d at 452.
15. Id. at 411, 436 S.E.2d at 452-53.
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were done with the good-faith belief that the landlord was obli-
gated to subordinate and did not constitute actionable duress."6
b. Public Policy
In Dade v. Anderson,' the court held that one spouse may
not recover under either a theory of implied contract or unjust
enrichment for services rendered to the other. The supreme
court found that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer
to a motion for judgment by a spouse seeking recovery for ser-
vices rendered to her deceased husband during his period of
incapacitation prior to death. According to the supreme court,
there have not been any changes in public policy since the
court decided this issue in 1951 that would justify reversing
itself. Justices Whiting, Lacy, and Keenan dissented. 8
c. Rescission
The plaintiff sued for rescission of a settlement agreement on
the grounds of fraud and mutual mistake of fact in Covington
v. Skill Corp Publishers, Inc. 9 The supreme court held that
the trial court incorrectly sustained a demurrer on the ground
that plaintiff "had failed to allege his 'readiness, willingness,
and ability to restore [the defendant] ... to the status quo by
returning [the settlement] money."" Although courts of equity
are "reluctant to rescind unless the parties can be put in [the]
status quo,"2 ' the court may have to determine an appropriate
method of restoration or the exact amount to be restored. A
tender of restoration, the court held, is not a precondition to a
right of action for rescission.'
16. Id. at 411-12, 436 S.E.2d at 453.
17. 247 Va. 3, 439 S.E.2d 353 (1994).
18. Id.
19. 247 Va. 69, 439 S.E.2d 391 (1994).
20. Id. at 72, 439 S.E.2d at 392.
21. Id.
22. Id.
962 [Vol. 28:959
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
d. Tortious Interference
In Peace v. Conway,'s two former employees went into com-
petition with their former employer and solicited his customers
solely using names that they recalled from memory. The cus-
tomers had terminable at-will contracts with their former em-
ployer. Where contracts are terminable at-will, the court ex-
plained, a prima facie case of tortious interference exists only
where there has been intentional interference using improper
methods. 4 Here, the former employees did not take any docu-
ments or utilize any property belonging to their former employ-
er, and the supreme court held that they were free to solicit
business from customers whose names they remembered.'
Because they did not use improper methods, they were not
liable.'
In Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. v. DePew,27 the court held
that an allegation of tortious interference with an at-will con-
tract can be sustained only where the defendant used "improper
methods" in the intentional interference causing a termination
of the contract.' An employee's breach of a noncompetition
agreement after ceasing work for his employer may constitute
the "improper method" necessary to sustain a cause of action
for intentional interference and for a conspiracy to interfere
with such a contract.' Similarly, when an employee, during
the course of employment, suggests to a customer that the cus-
tomer cease doing business with the employer, there exists a
breach of fiduciary duty sufficient to constitute an improper
method. Once an employer terminates employment, however,
the employee owes no fiduciary duty to the employer and may
23. 246 Va. 278, 435 S.E.2d 133 (1993).
24. "Improper methods may include violence, threats or intimidation, bribery,
unfounded litigation, fraud, misrepresentation or deceit, defamation, duress, undue
influence, misuse of inside or confidential information, or breach of a fiduciary rela-
tionship." Id. at 280, 435 S.E.2d at 135 (citing Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 227,
360 S.E.2d 832, 836 (1987)).
25. Id.
26. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958).
27. 247 Va. 240, 440 S.E.2d 918 (1994).
28. Id. at 245, 440 S.E.2d at 921-22.
29. Id.
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compete with the employer in the absence of a contract or spe-
cial circumstances to the contrary.30
3. Economic Loss
The supreme court consistently has ruled that privity of con-
tract is an essential element in actions seeking damages for an
economic loss resulting from negligent performance of a contrac-
tual commitment. In Ward v. Ernst & Young,3 the court spe-
cifically declined to adopt section 552 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, which allows a third-party beneficiary of a con-
tract to maintain a cause of action for accountant malpractice
even in the absence of privity of contract5 2 The loss suffered
by the plaintiff, diminution in the value of stock sold to a third
party, was disappointed economic expectations, a purely eco-
nomic loss.' It was not property damage sufficient to over-
come the privity requirement.'
4. Eminent Domain
Recent litigation involving eminent domain concerned the
admissibility of evidence as well as the definition of "fair mar-
ket value."
30. Id. at 248, 440 S.E.2d at 923.
31. 246 Va. 317, 435 S.E.2d 628 (1993).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
33. 246 Va. at 325, 435 S.E.2d at 632.
34. Id. In a surprising footnote, the court interpreted Rotonda Condominium Unit
Owners Ass'n v. Rotonda Assocs., 238 Va. 85, 380 S.E.2d 876 (1989), as not barring a
tort suit for economic loss:
These observations [of the court in Rotonda], cannot fairly be interpret-
ed to mean that economic losses are never recoverable in tort. The lan-
guage employed here has its predicate in the tort alleged in the
Association's negligence count; it does not purport to foreclose a right to
recover an economic loss in other tort actions such as those for fraud,
conspiracy to injure another in a trade, business, or profession, or tor-
tious interference with contract.
246 Va. at 325 n.2, 435 S.E.2d at 632 n.2. Some circuit courts had interpreted
Rotonda to mean exactly what this footnote says that it does not mean: i.e., Virginia
law bars a tort claim for purely economic loss. See, e.g., P&T Assocs. v. Paciulli,
Simmons & Assocs., 27 Va. Cir. 405 (City of Richmond 1992); Pender Veterinary
Clinic v. Patton, Harris, Rust & Assocs., 22 Va. Cir. 237 (Fairfax County 1990), affd
on reconsideration, 23 Va. Cir. 106 (1991).
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In Kipps v. Virginia Natural Gas, Inc.,' the trial court cor-
rectly excluded testimony of an appraiser in a condemnation
case that the value of remaining land was diminished because
of a prospective purchaser's fear of the danger of a natural gas
pipeline explosion. The witness had not researched the subject,
had performed no analysis of the pipeline's effect on the
residue's value, and his opinion was unsupported by any study
or analysis."5 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that the witness did not have the necessary exper-
tise to render an opinion on diminution in the value of the res-
idue of the property."
In Lynch v. Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner,,
the trial court incorrectly excluded testimony and drawings
relating to the effect that the highway department's taking
would have on the landowner's ability to develop his property
as an office/industrial park. In determining damages to the
residue, consideration may be given to every circumstance,
present or future, that affects the residue's value at the time of
the taking.39 Although remote or speculative advantages and
disadvantages are not to be considered, the evidence here was
that the landowner's property was adaptable and suitable for
development as an office/industrial park and that such use may
be the highest and best use of the land. It represented a real
and present potential use in light of the existing conditions and
circumstances.'
In Fairfax County Park Authority v. Virginia Department of
Transportation,41 the Virginia Department of Transportation
sought to condemn a portion of property held by the Park Au-
thority as the beneficiary of a trust. The trust provided that if
the property was used for any purpose other than a public
park, it would pass to the trustees of a church. The issue here,
just as with real estate taxation, was the fair market value of
the land, not the value of the land to the owner. The court held
35. 247 Va. 162, 441 S.E.2d 4 (1994).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 247 Va. 388, 442 S.E.2d 388 (1994).
39. Id. at 391, 442 S.E.2d at 390.
40. Id.
41. 247 Va. 259, 440 S.E.2d 610 (1994).
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that the same definition of "fair market value" applies in taxa-
tion and condemnation cases." There was no evidence that the
land "was so committed to use as a park that it was not eco-
nomically feasible to put the land to other uses."' The fair
market value of the property condemned should have been
determined without regard to the use restrictions placed on it
by the trust agreement.
5. Employment
According to Lockhart v. Commonwealth Education Systems
Corp.,4 under certain circumstances plaintiffs may sue for
wrongful discharge in Virginia. There, the plaintiffs brought
suit against their former employer for wrongful discharge, alleg-
ing that they had been terminated because of their race and
sex. Although "Virginia strongly adheres to the employment-at-
will doctrine," discharges that violate public policy are action-
able.' Here, the General Assembly has declared Virginia's
strong public policy against employment discrimination based
on race or gender in the Virginia Human Rights Act.46 Even
though the Act does not create private causes of action, it
makes clear the public policy of Virginia. Consequently, plain-
tiffs have the right to sue for wrongful discharge. Chief Justice
Carrico and Justices Compton and Stephenson dissented.47
6. Fraud
Concealment of a material fact may constitute the element of
misrepresentation for purposes of a fraud action. In Van Deusen
v. Snead,' the motion for judgment alleged that sellers of a
home took affirmative steps designed to conceal the existence of
defects of which they were aware, e.g., hiding cracks in the
basement by placing objects in front of the cracks and spread-
42. Id. at 263, 440 S.E.2d at 612.
43. Id.
44. 247 Va. 98, 439 S.E.2d 328 (1994).
45. Id. at 102, 439 S.E.2d at 330.
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-715 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
47. 247 Va. 98, 439 S.E.2d 328 (1994).
48. 247 Va. 324, 441 S.E.2d 207 (1994).
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ing mortar over cracks in the foundation. The court stated that
"an allegation of concealment by conduct is equivalent to an
allegation of a verbal misrepresentation of a material fact."49
Thus the court found that the bill of complaint stated a cause
of action for fraud.'
7. Premises Liability
a. Assumption of Risk
In Waters v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,51 the plaintiff slipped on
ice outside of a Safeway. Assumption of the risk connotes ven-
turousness and is a jury question unless reasonable minds
cannot differ on the issue.52 The plaintiff knew that the ice
was present and that one might slip and fall on it, but she had
successfully reached the entrance to the store and believed that
she also could safely exit.' Whether plaintiff was venturesome
in exiting the premises was a factual matter to be resolved by
the jury. The trial court erred in striking plaintiffs evidence.'
b. Criminal Acts of Another
The owner or occupier of premises ordinarily is under no
duty to protect an invitee from a third person's criminal act
committed while the invitee is upon the premises.' In Gupton
v. Quicke,' however, the motion for judgment properly alleged
facts falling within a narrow exception to the general rule. That
exception applies when the owner or occupier knows that crimi-
nal assaults against persons are occurring or are about to occur
on the premises that indicate an imminent probability of harm
to an invitee.5" The plaintiff alleged that he was threatened on
the premises of defendants' caf6 by one Lively, that Lively was
49. Id. at 329, 441 S.E.2d at 210.
50. Id.
51. 246 Va. 269, 435 S.E.2d 380 (1993).
52. Id. at 271, 435 S.E.2d 381.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 272, 435 S.E.2d at 382.
55. Wright v. Webb, 234 Va. 527, 362 S.E.2d 919 (1987).
56. 247 Va. 362, 442 S.E.2d 658 (1994).
57. Wright, 234 Va. at 533, 362 S.E.2d at 922.
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removed from the caf6 while still threatening the plaintiff, that
the defendants thereafter allowed Lively to reenter the caf6,
and that Lively violently attacked the plaintiff." These facts
alleged an "imminent probability of harm" to the plaintiff and
triggered a duty on the defendants' part to exercise reasonable
care to control Lively's conduct to prevent him from causing
harm to the plaintiff.59
8. Workers' Injuries
The court returned to the meaning of "injury by accident" in
Middlekauff v. Allstate Insurance Co.,' in which plaintiff sued
her employer for emotional distress arising from abusive behav-
ior by her supervisors. Defendant successfully invoked the
Workers' Compensation Act in the trial court, which held that
plaintiff alleged "an injury, by accident, arising out of and in
the course of her employment with Allstate," and therefore her
claim was barred by the Act.6
In Middlekauff, the court had to reconcile two conflicting
cases. In Morris v. Morris,62 the court defined an "injury by
accident" as an "identifiable incident or sudden precipitating
event [that results] in an obvious sudden mechanical or struc-
tural change in the body."' In Haddon v. Metropolitan Life In-
surance Co.," however, the court held that the Act is the ex-
58. Gupton, 247 Va. at 363, 442 S.E.2d at 659.
59. Id. A case decided before Gupton, Godfrey v. Boddie-Noell Enter., interpreted
Wright v. Webb slightly differently. In Godfrey, an unknown third party shot the
plaintiff in the drive-through line of a Hardee's restaurant at 3 o'clock in the morn-
ing. There was some history of disturbances at the restaurant, but there was evi-
dence that defendant had taken measures to increase security. The court held that
the rule of Wright v. Webb applies to a business that incorporates a criminal element
directly or indirectly into its method of conducting business, such as a business that
somehow directly benefits from the presence of criminal or assaultive behavior. The
court found that the Hardee's restaurant was not such a business. 843 F. Supp. 114,
123 (E.D. Va. 1994). The court decided Godfrey on a motion for judgment as a matter
of law after the jury could not reach a verdict. It therefore may not be inconsistent
with Gupton, which was an appeal of a dismissal on demurrer and therefore had no
record for the supreme court to review.
60. 247 Va. 150, 439 S.E.2d 394 (1994).
61. Id. at 152, 439 S.E.2d at 395-96.
62. 238 Va. 578, 385 S.E.2d 858 (1989).
63. Id. at 589, 385 S.E.2d at 865.
64. 239 Va. 397, 389 S.E.2d 712 (1990).
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clusive remedy for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on a continuing pattern of sexual harassment.
Three Justices (Whiting, Lacy, and Keenan) voted to overrule
Haddon because it had ignored the line of cases, including Mor-
ris, that have held that a gradual injury (such as emotional
distress resulting from harassment) is not within the Act.'
Two Justices (Poff and Stephenson) concurred in the result,
explaining that they would not overrule Haddon, but would
limit it to the proposition that an intentional tort by a fellow
employee may be an "accident" within the Act.' The remain-
ing two Justices (Carrico and Compton) dissented. They would
hold that Haddon controls and requires the court to hold that
Middlekauff's claim was valid.' Like the plaintiff in Haddon,
the dissent argued Middlekauff suffered an injury from the
intentional tort of a fellow servant, and her claim should there-
fore have been accepted.'
Five months after deciding Middlekauff, the court explicitly
overruled Haddon in Lichtman v. Knouf.9 In Lichtman, plain-
tiff sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising
out of her employment. The trial court dismissed the suit on
the grounds that the Workers' Compensation Act was plaintiffs
exclusive remedy. The supreme court, with Chief Justice
Carrico and Justice Compton dissenting, reversed. In a brief
opinion that reviewed the conflicting lines of cases, the court
stated that previous cases, including Middlekauff, had held that
"an 'injury by accident' for purposes of the Act does not include
a gradually incurred injury."70 The court overruled Haddon "to
the extent that it placed gradually incurred injuries within the
definition of 'injury by accident." 7'
65. 247 Va. at 154, 439 S.E.2d at 397.
66. Id. at 155, 439 S.E.2d at 397-98.
67. Id. at 155, 439 S.E.2d at 398.
68. Id.
69. No. 931464 (Va. June 10, 1994).
70. Id. at 155, 439 S.E.2d at 398.
71. Id., slip op. at 3.
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C. Affirmative Defenses
1. Collateral Estoppel
The jury's failure to award damages in a wrongful-death
action barred a participant in an automobile accident from
denying contributory negligence in Reid v. Ayscue." Gwendolyn
Reid had been the driver in a two-car accident that resulted in
the death of her mother. Gwendolyn's brother, Ronald, brought
a wrongful death action against the driver and owner of the
other vehicle. The defendants in the wrongful-death action filed
a third-party motion for judgment against Gwendolyn, seeking
contribution. The judge severed this claim from the wrongful-
death action.7" In the wrongful-death action, the jury returned
a verdict against the defendants. The jury awarded $26,633 in
medical and funeral expenses to the estate, $50,000 to Ronald,
and nothing to Gwendolyn." The contribution plaintiffs then
moved for summary judgment against Gwendolyn.75 The trial
court correctly ruled that Gwendolyn was collaterally estopped
from denying her contributory negligence. The jury in the
wrongful death action was instructed that any negligence by
Gwendolyn would bar a recovery by her.7" The evidence estab-
lished that Gwendolyn and her mother previously had a warm
and loving relationship.7 The only rational interpretation of
the jury's failure to award damages to Gwendolyn is that the
jury believed that she was negligent. The contribution plaintiffs
met their burden of establishing the requisites of collateral
estoppel."
72. 246 Va. 454, 436 S.E.2d 439 (1993).
73. Id. at 456, 436 S.E.2d at 440.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 457, 436 S.E.2d at 441.
77. Id.
78. Id. There was no dispute that there was an identity of parties between the
two actions. The trial court found that the "real plaintiffs in the Reid v. Ayscue
wrongful death action were the statutory beneficiaries, Ronald and Gwendolyn Reid,"
and Gwendolyn did not dispute this in the supreme court. Id. at 457, 436 S.E.2d at
440.
970 [Vol. 28:959
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2. Contributory Negligence
The supreme court rejected age as a factor when determining
the negligence of an automobile driver in Thomas v. Settle.79
The plaintiffs decedent, age sixteen, was struck in the rear by
a truck. The trial court incorrectly instructed the jury that the
standard by which the decedent's conduct was to be measured
was "that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and
experience."' The reasonable care of automobile drivers, the
court noted, is not to be measured by their age or ability."'
Rather, minors should be held to the same standard of care as
an adult when operating a motor vehicle, namely, the degree of
care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the
same or similar circumstances. 2
3. Fireman's Rule
In Goodwin v. Hare,8' the Supreme Court of Virginia held
for the first time that the fireman's rule is inapplicable to in-
tentional torts. A police officer therefore was entitled to pursue
her claim for personal injuries intentionally inflicted by the
defendant in resisting a lawful arrest.' Dissenting, Justices
Compton and Lacy would have held that the issue was whether
the act causing injury was of the type that a police officer
should expect to encounter, not whether the act was intentional
or negligent.'
79. 247 Va. 15, 439 S.E.2d 360 (1994).
80. Id. at 21, 439 S.E.2d at 363.
81. Id. at 22, 439 S.E.2d at 364.
82. Id.
83. 246 Va. 402, 436 S.E.2d 605 (1993).
84. Id. at 405, 436 S.E.2d at 606.
85. Id. at 405-06, 436 S.E.2d at 606-07.
1994] 971
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4. Limitations
a. Emotional Distress for Injury to Another
In Mahony v. Becker,' the plaintiffs sued for emotional dis-
tress resulting from alleged sexual abuse of their child by the
defendant. The acts occurred from 1974 to 1978.87 The plain-
tiffs learned of the acts in 1991, and filed suit in 1992. The
plaintiffs' claims, if valid, were wholly derivative of their
daughter's claim. Because any cause of action accrued at the
latest in 1978 when the daughter allegedly was injured, not in
1991, the action was time-barred.'
b. Wrongful Birth
In Glascock v. Laserna,89 a suit by parents for the medical
expenses incurred in caring for their daughter, who was born
with numerous congenital abnormalities, was time-barred. The
parents alleged that had the mother's gynecologist properly
detected the child's problems before birth, they would have
chosen to abort the child.' They sought as damages the medi-
cal expenses incurred for their child's care and treatment.9
The defendants pled in bar the two-year personal injury statute
of limitations. 92 The trial court granted the special plea, and
the supreme court afirmed.8 Plaintiffs did not allege that de-
fendants caused "personal injury" to the child, so plaintiffs were
not entitled to the five-year limitation period of section 8.01-
243(B).94 They pled a personal action, to which the two-year
statute applied.95
86. 246 Va. 209, 435 S.E.2d 139 (1993).
87. Id. at 210, 435 S.E.2d at 140.
88. Id. at 213, 435 S.E.2d at 141.
89. 247 Va. 108, 439 S.E.2d 380 (1994).
90. Id. at 109-10, 439 S.E.2d at 381.
91. Id. at 110, 439 S.E.2d at 381.
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(A) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
93. 247 Va. at 110, 439 S.E.2d at 381.
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(B) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
95. 247 Va. at 110, 439 S.E.2d at 381.
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5. Sovereign Immunity
The court applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity to ac-
tions of a physician employed by a public health facility in Lohr
v. Larsen.' There, the plaintiff, a patient at the Waynesboro
Public Health Clinic, sued a health clinic doctor for medical
malpractice in failing to diagnose breast cancer. Unlike doctors
at the University of Virginia Hospital in James v. Jane,7 the
defendant was performing a function that was an essential part
of the clinic's delivery of health services, which in turn were an
integral part of the Commonwealth's statutory objective of pro-
tecting public health. The doctor's exercise of discretion was
part of the Commonwealth's health care program. The court
noted that the element of discretion was not limited to "govern-
mental policymakers. 98 The trial court correctly ruled that the
action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.'
Three justices dissented."°
D. Trial Proceedings and Evidence
1. Choice of Law
In Jones v. R. S. Jones & Associates,' the court held that
the substantive law of Florida and the procedural law of
Virginia applied to an action brought in Virginia arising out of
an airplane accident in Florida. The two-year statute of linuta-
tions provided by Florida law, even though not a part of its
wrongful death statute, is directed so specifically to the right of
action under the act as to warrant saying that the limitation
qualifies the right and is substantive law. 2
96. 246 Va. 81, 431 S.E.2d 642 (1993).
97. 221 Va. 43, 282 S.E.2d 864 (1980).
98. Lohr, 246 Va. at 87, 431 S.E.2d at 645.
99. Id. at 88, 431 S.E.2d at 646.
100. Id.
101. 246 Va. 3, 431 S.E.2d 33 (1993).
102. Id. at 5, 431 S.E.2d at 34.
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2. Expert Evidence
Expert testimony ordinarily is necessary in a medical
malpractice action "to establish the appropriate standard of
care, a deviation from that standard, and that such deviation
was the proximate cause of damages. In certain rare instances,
however,... expert testimony is unnecessary because the
alleged act of negligence clearly lies within the range of the
jury's common knowledge and experience.""°  In Beverly
Enterprises-Virginia, Inc. v. Nichols, the plaintiff's decedent
suffered from Alzheimer's disease, was unable to feed herself,
and had two serious choking incidents while under the care of
her family.' All of this was known to the defendant nursing
home. Nevertheless, the defendant's employee left a tray of food
with the decedent and failed to assist her in eating her meal.
The court held that the jury did not need expert testimony to
determine whether the defendant was negligent under the
circumstances. 5
Expert testimony is admissible only when specialized skill
and knowledge are required to assist the jury in evaluating the
merits of a claim. Issues of this type generally arise in cases in-
volving the practice of professions requiring advanced education,
such as engineering, medicine, and law, or those involving
trades that focus upon scientific matters, such as electricity and
blasting. The issue in Board of Supervisors v. Lake Services,
Inc.,"° was whether defendant used ordinary care in dredging
a lake given its knowledge of the fluctuating water level and
the presence of known underwater obstructions, including
plaintiffs sewer line. The issue did not concern a scientific
matter that required expert testimony, and the trial court erred
in striking the plaintiffs evidence.' 7
A litigant may cross-examine an expert witness by reading
excerpts from scientific articles that the expert recognizes as
103. Beverly Enterprises-Virginia, Inc. v. Nichols, 247 Va. 264, 267, 441 S.E.2d 1,
3 (1994).
104. Id. at 265, 441 S.E.2d at 2.
105. Id. at 268, 441 S.E.2d at 3.
106. 247 Va. 293, 440 S.E.2d 600 (1994).
107. Id. at 297, 440 S.E.2d at 602.
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standard and authoritative in the field. In Griffett v. Ryan,"'8
the witness acknowledged that the author of an article was
authoritative on the staging of lung cancer but did not testify
that the specific article was standard and authoritative in the
field. It was error to allow the cross-examination. The article
used during the cross-examination, not the author, must be
recognized as standard and authoritative. The court found,
however, that the error was harmless."
3. Jury Selection
In Hill v. Berry,"° the venire consisted of ten whites and
three blacks. Defendant's counsel used his peremptory strikes to
remove all three blacks."' Although the plaintiffs motion con-
cerning the use of the peremptory strikes was made after the
jury was sworn, the trial court implicitly granted him leave of
court to make his motion, as allowed by Virginia Code sec-
tion 8.01-352. Once the plaintiff established a prima facie case
of purposeful discrimination, the burden shifted to the defen-
dant to present a racially neutral explanation for removing the
black veniremen." The reasons offered by the defendant's
counsel--'just intuitive reasons, the way people look-just a
sense"-failed to satisfy the defendant's burden.11 The trial
court thus erred in denying the plaintiffs motion."4
E. Appellate Practice
1. Interlocutory Appeal
In Leggett v. Caudill,"5 the plaintiff sued a minister, his
church, and other related entities. Her claim for infliction of
emotional distress was dismissed on demurrer on October 7,
108. 247 Va. 465, 443 S.E.2d 149 (1994).
109. Id. at 474, 443 S.E.2d at 154.
110. 247 Va. 271, 441 S.E.2d 6 (1994).
111. Id. at 272, 441 S.E.2d 6 (1994).
112. Id. at 275, 441 S.E.2d at 8.
113. Id. at 273, 441 S.E.2d at 7.
114. Id. at 275, 441 S.E.2d at 8.
115. 247 Va. 130, 439 S.E.2d 350 (1994).
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1992.116 Plaintiff noted her appeal from this order on October
15, 1992.1 Her other two counts were dismissed in November
1992, and the plaintiff did not appeal."' The court held that
the October 7, 1992, order was interlocutory in nature because
claims remained against the other defendants in the case."'
The general rule is that a judgment is not final for purposes of
appeal if it is rendered with regard to some but not all of the
parties in the case.2 An exception to this rule applies when
there is an adjudication that is final with regard to a collateral
matter, separate and distinct from the general subject of the
litigation, and affecting only particular parties to the
controversy.'2 ' In Leggett, however, the allegations against all
defendants derived from the actions of the minister. The Octo-
ber 7, 1992, order was thus not appealable, and the court dis-
missed the appeal as improvidently granted."
2. Preservation of Error
In Luckett v. Jennings,"2 the defendant argued that the
failure to note on the final order the specific grounds of objec-
tion barred the plaintiffs appeal from an order sustaining a
demurrer. The supreme court disagreed. Plaintiff-appellant's
memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the
demurrer combined with his objection to the trial court's ruling
as noted on the final order"M was sufficient to preserve the
issue for appeal."
The appellant was not so fortunate in United Leasing Corp.
v. Thrift Insurance Corp.'26 The trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant, stating that it was ruling "on
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 132, 439 S.E.2d at 351.
120. Wells v. Whittaker, 207 Va. 616, 628, 151 S.E.2d 422, 432 (1966).
121. Id., 151 S.E.2d at 432.
122. Leggett, 247 Va. at 135, 439 S.E.2d at 353.
123. 246 Va. 303, 435 S.E.2d 400 (1993).
124. The opinion does not quote the objection.
125. 246 Va. 303, 435 S.E.2d 400.
126. 247 Va. 299, 440 S.E.2d 902 (1994).
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[defendant's] reasons."' 7 The "reasons" to which the trial
court referred included all grounds advanced by the defendant.
Because the plaintiff failed to assign error to two of the
grounds urged by the defendants, the order entering summary
judgment became final and barred any appellate relief that
otherwise might have been available.' Moreover, the
plaintiff's written response to the defendant's demurrer did not
attempt to refute the defendant's argument that the motion for
judgment failed to state a cause of action for negligence.'
Plaintiff did not address the negligence theory in its argument
before the trial court, and its general objection to the trial
court's final order did not specify that the order was erroneous
for this reason. The supreme court would not consider the argu-
ment on appeal."'
IH. RECENT LEGISLATION AFFECTING CIVIL PRACTICE
The General Assembly enacted a number of measures during
its 1994 Session that affect legislation in state courts.'31 For
ease of reference, the discussion of these enactments is clas-
sified below by subject matter.
A. Process
Section 8.01-277 (motion to quash defective process) now
provides that, upon sustaining the motion, the court may strike
the proof of service, not "dismiss the action."'32
B. Mediation
A new section 46.2-1572.2 (mediation of disputes involving
motor vehicle franchises) was added to provide for nonbinding
127. Id. at 302, 440 S.E.2d at 904.
128. Id. at 307, 440 S.E.2d at 907.
129. Id. at 308, 440 S.E.2d at 908.
130. Id.
131. Unless otherwise noted, all provisions became effective on July 1, 1994.
132. Act of Mar. 7, 1994, ch. 37, 1994 Va. Acts 111 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-277 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
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mediation at the request of either party at any time prior to a
hearing before the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.'"
C. Affirmative Defenses
A new section 8.01-264 grants volunteer workers in hospices
for the terminally ill civil immunity for their acts of ordinary
negligence."
D. Medical Records
Amendments to section 8.01-413 (admissibility and subpoena
of medical records) provide that computer printouts of records
shall be admissible under the same conditions as other forms of
records.'35 The legislature also amended the section to add
"nursing facility" to the list of enumerated health care
providers.' The section also now requires compensation to
the health care provider for the service of maintaining, retriev-
ing, reviewing, and preparing the medical records, but within
the previous limits of fifty cents for each page up to fifty pages
and twenty-five cents a page for the remainder."'
E. Priest-Penitent Privilege
An amendment to section 8.01-400 strengthened Virginia's
priest-penitent privilege. The section now provides that no min-
ister of religion to whom the statute applies shall be required
to relinquish notes, records, or any written documentation made
by the minister or to disclose the contents of any such notes,
records, or written documentation in discovery proceedings."
133. Act of Apr. 7, 1994, ch. 418, 1994 586 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.62-
1572.2 (Repl. Vol. 1994)).
134. Act of Apr. 10, 1994, ch. 738, Va. Acts 1101 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-226.4 (Cum. Supp. (1994)).
135. Act of Apr. 6, 1994, ch. 390, 1994 Va. Acts 566 (codified at VP. CODE ANN. §
8.01-413 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
136. Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 572, 1994 Va. Acts 796 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-413 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-413 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
138. Act of Apr. 2, 1994, ch. 198, 1994 Va. Acts 290 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-400 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
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F. Expert Testimony
The General Assembly continued to enact the Federal Rules
of Evidence into the Virginia Code with an amendment to sec-
tion 8.01-401.1."' The amendment enacts Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803(18), which allows an expert to read from learned
treatises under certain conditions.' The amended statute fur-
ther provides that copies of the statements to be read from the
learned treatise on direct examination shall be disclosed to the
other side thirty days before trial.14 1
G. Punitive Damages
The General Assembly also added section 8.01-44.5 (exem-
plary damages for persons injured by intoxicated drivers) to
allow punitive damages in an action for personal injury or
death arising from operation of a motor vehicle, engine, or
train, when (1) at the time of the accident, the defendant had a
blood alcohol concentration of 0.15% or more by weight; (2) the
defendant knew that he was going to be operating a motor
vehicle, engine, or train at the time that he began, or while he
was, drinking alcohol; and (3) the defendant's intoxication was
a proximate cause of the injury to or death of the plaintiff.'
H. Additur
Under revised section 8.01-383.1, the trial court, if it finds
the damages to be inadequate, may award a new trial or put
defendant on terms to pay a greater amount or submit to a
new trial." If additur is accepted by either party under pro-
test, it may be reviewed on appeal.
139. Act of Apr. 5, 1994, ch. 328, 1994 Va. Acts 458 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-401.1 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 570, 1994 Va. Acts 795 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-44.5 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
143. Act of Apr. 11, 1994, ch. 807, 1994 Va. Acts 1253 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-383.1 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
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IV. CHANGES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA RULES
A number of changes of interest to litigators were enacted in
Part V of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia during
the past year.
Rule 4:5 (Depositions upon oral examination) was amended to
provide that if a nonparty witness is not a resident of the Com-
monwealth, his deposition may be taken in the locality where
he resides or is employed, or at any other location agreed upon
by the parties.' The Rule was also amended to provide that
the restrictions as to parties within the Commonwealth set
forth in the Rule shall not apply where no responsive pleading
has been filed or an appearance otherwise made.'
Rule 4:7A (Audio-visual depositions) was amended to delete
former subsection (b), "Use of clock."'
Rule 5:7 (Original jurisdiction of Supreme Court) was amend-
ed to rewrite, subsections (a)-(c) and to add the requirement
that in cases brought by prisoners pro se, a copy of the applica-
tion shall be forwarded to the respondent by first class mail,
accompanied by a certificate of service. 47
Rule 5:23 (Perfection of appeal; docketing) was amended to
make technical changes in subsection (b)."
144. VA. SuP. CT. R. 4:5(al) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
145. Id.
146. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:7A (Repl. Vol. 1994).
147. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:7(a)-(c) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
148. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:23(b) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
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